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Michael B. Edwards'
An estimated 2.3 billion spam2 electronic messages (e-
mails) are sent daily.3 An average Internet user is likely to receive
approximately 1,500 spam e-mails by 2006.4 Spam e-mail has
increased an incredible 450% in the year between summer 2001
and summer 2002. 5 According to a recent European Union study,
the cost to consumers and businesses of unsolicited e-mail is
between eight and ten billion dollars annually, and other damages
include decreased productivity, time taken to delete unwanted
messages, server crashes, and the higher cost of Internet access.
6
Money spent to combat spam is estimated to reach $88 million this
year, a cost that is expected to double by 2006.7
As significant as these costs are, the estimated cost to the
spammer is a mere .00032 cents per message, 8 or $320 per million
e-mails sent. Based on the numbers above, spammers pay an
annual cost of approximately $270 million.9 Compared with the
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2004.
2 David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws: Glossary (last visited Nov. 17, 2002) at
http://www.spamlaws.com/glossary.html (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology) (defining spam as unsolicited bulk e-mail or
unsolicited commercial e-mail). For purposes of this article, spam e-mail and
bulk e-mail will be used interchangeably.
3 Henry Norr, Spam Stampede Clogs Internet, E-mail Now One-third
Advertising, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 8, 2002), at
http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/09/08/MN 1370
44.DTL (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
4 Daniel Tynan, Spam Inc., PC WORLD, Aug. 2002, at 108.
5 Sam Vaknin, The Economics of Spain-I, UNITED PRESS INT'L (July 23, 2002),
at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StorylD=20020723-121152-365 1 r (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).6id.
7 Id. (citing an unlisted Radicati Group report).
8 Vaknin, supra note 5.
9 This is based on the following calculation: 2.3 billion e-mails sent daily x 365
days x .00032 cents/message = $268,640,000.
eight to ten billion dollars in costs for consumers and businesses,' 0
this cost differential amounts to a gigantic exercise in cost
shifting." Litigation expenses, however, effectively take the free
out of free ride by shifting costs back to spammers, costs that may
ultimately put them out of business.
12
With the costs of spam rising rapidly, North Carolinians
might be heartened to know that the North Carolina General
Assembly passed a fairly comprehensive anti-spain statute 13 in
1999 aimed at protecting average e-mail users and Internet service
providers ("ISPs") from spam. Yet, in the two and one half years
since the passage of the North Carolina anti-spam statute, no cases
have been fully litigated under the Act."
4
This note will take an in-depth look at the North Carolina
anti-spain statute, compare relevant parts of the statute with similar
provisions in other state statutes, explore remedies and pitfalls
brought to light by case law, and address why the North Carolina
law's substantive strength does not bear on its actual use. The
North Carolina anti-spam statute will likely withstand challenges
under the First Amendment15 and the dormant Commerce Clause
16
10 See Vaknin, supra note 5.
11 See David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 Buffalo L. Rev. 1001, 1019 (1997)
(comparing junk faxes to junk e-mail, and documenting complaints by Congress
that junk faxes amounted to receiving "junk mail with the postage due")
(quoting Jerry Knight, The Junk Fax Attack: Why Maryland May Outlaw
Unsolicited Advertisements, WASH. POST, May 23, 1989, at C3).
12 Earthlink Networks v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., No. BC 167502 (Cal. Super.
Ct. L.A. County, Mar. 30, 1998) (credited with putting defendant out of spam
mail business) (quoting Earthlink Pressroom, Cyber Promotions Finally Chokes
on Its Own Spam (March 30, 1998), at
http://www.earthlink.net/about/press/prcpjudgement/) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)).
13 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453(lb), (4a), (6b), (6c), 14-458(6)(b)-
(c), 1-539.2A(a), 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
4But see Political Spamming, THE DAILY TAR HEEL, Oct. 9, 2002, at 10 (A suit
was recently filed against the Elizabeth Dole Senate Campaign for sending
political e-mail. This suit is destined to fail, as the e-mail is not commercial in
nature, and firthermore, the First Amendment protects political expression.).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
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but will, nonetheless, remain ineffective due to the lack of state
enforcement resources, a scarcity in individual lawsuits, the
management decisions of ISPs, and spammers' ingenuity.
I. The North Carolina Unsolicited Electronic Bulk
Commercial Mail Act
The North Carolina statute has four substantive parts, along
with other sections covering standing, criminal penalties, and
damages. 7 A statutory violation of the Act occurs when a person
sends unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail into or within the state
18
that falsely identifies with an "intent to deceive or defraud the
recipient" or that contains forged routing information and that
violates an ISP's' 9 policies.2 ° Standing is granted to individuals,21
ISPs, 22 and the state.23 Criminal penalties range from a Class 3
misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony, depending on the amount of
property damage caused by the spam e-mail.24
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress shall have the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes").
17 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453(lb), (4a), (6b) (6c), (10), §§ 14-
458(6)(b)-(c), § 1-539.2A(a), § 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
18 § 1-75.4(4)(c).
19 § 14-453(6c) (defining email service provider as "any person who.., is an
intermediary in sending or receiving electronic mail" and provides to end users
"the ability to send or receive electronic mail"). For purposes of this article, ISP
and email service provider will be used interchangeably.
20 § 14-458(a)(6).
21 § 14-458(a)(6)(c); § 1-539.2A(a).
22 § 1-539.2A(a).
23 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458(a)(6)(b) (giving standing to the state by virtue of
criminal penalties contained therein) (2002).
24 § 14-458(a)(6)(b).
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A. Legislative Intent
The North Carolina bill was modeled after existing statutes
25 26 2in Washington, California, and Virginia.27 The clear intent was
to facilitate quick and efficient access to the Internet for users
instead of "having the system clogged with unsolicited bulk e-
mail."28 The statute discourages spamming by giving ISPs,
individual users, and the state standing to sue spammers and
collect damages.
29
B. Unsolicited Electronic Bulk Commercial Mail
The North Carolina statute only applies to e-mail that is
both commercial and unsolicited. Commercial electronic mail is
defined as "messages sent and received electronically consisting of
commercial advertising material, the principal purpose of which is
to promote the for-profit sale or lease of goods or services to the
recipient., 30 "Unsolicited" means e-mail sent to anyone with
whom the initiator does not have an "existing business or personal
relationship" and that is not sent at the "request of, or with the
express consent of, the recipient.,
31
25 WASH. REv. CODE § 19.190.020 (2002) (amended 1999).
26 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4 (Deering 2002).
27 An Act to Extend North Carolina's "Long Arm Jurisdiction" Statute to
Include Senders of Unsolicited Electronic Bulk Mail and to Make the Sending of
Unsolicited Electronic Bulk Commercial Mail Unlawful in This State: Hearing
on S.B. 288 Before the Senate Information Technology Committee, 1999 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. 1 (N.C. 1999) [hereinafter Hearing] (referencing Sen. Reeves who
added that the Virginia anti-spain statute is "much more-punitive" than North
Carolina's proposed bill). See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4 (2002).28Hearing, supra note 27, at 1-2..29 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453(lb), (4a), (6b) (6c), (10), 14-
458(6)(b)-(c), 1-539.2A(a), 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
30 § 14-453(lb) (emphasis added).
3' § 14-453(10).
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C. The First Amendment and the Central Hudson
32
Test
Although the initial scope of the North Carolina bill
covered all e-mail, the General Assembly eventually limited its
scope to commercial e-mail,33 with the exception that an
organization may send commercial e-mail to its members.34
Two theories best support the inclusion of the word
"commercial" in the North Carolina statute. First, as a practical
matter, spam is almost exclusively commercial in nature. To date,
there has been little practical gain in legislating against non-
commercial e-mail. For example, even though the Virginia statute
does not include the word "commercial" within the definitions
section of the statute,35 it has been utilized primarily in litigation
against commercial e-mail.36 Second and, perhaps, more
importantly, government regulation of non-commercial speech
would almost certainly implicate the First Amendment.37 While
the First Amendment does not protect against speech restrictions
32 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
33 Hearing, supra note 27, at 1-2 (citing statement of Sen. Eric Reeves, Chair,
Information Technology Committee, giving no reasons other than "various
special interests" for the change in the text).
34 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
35 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.2 (2002) (not including the word
"commercial" within its definition of spain).
36 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp.
2d 1255, 1270 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (applying Virginia law); Am. Online, Inc. v.
Over the Air Equip., No. 97-1547-A, 1997 WL 1073949 (E.D. Va. Nov. 19,
1997); Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va.
2002).
37 Max P. Ochoa, Legislative Note: Recent State Laws Regulating Unsolicited
Electronic Mail, SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J., 459, 464 (2000).
See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 562-3 ("The Constitution
... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression'."). But see David J. Goldstone, A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Cyber Forum: Public vs. Private in
Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 63-5, 70 (1998) (cautioning against
denying commercial e-mailers First Amendment protections).
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by a private party,38 its protections do circumscribe government
action.39 The government, nonetheless, may restrict certain types
of speech, such as commercial speech,4° subject to the test set forth
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission.41 Because the North Carolina statute regulates
commercial speech,42 the Central Hudson test would apply.
Central Hudson arose from a challenge to a New York
regulation banning a utility company from promotional
advertising.43 The Supreme Court, in reversing the New York
Court of Appeals' validation of the regulation on the ground that
the governmental interest involved outweighed the speech's
limited value,44 formulated a four-prong test 45 that analyzes
46restrictions on commercial speech. The first prong of the Central
Hudson test holds that unlawful or misleading speech is not
protected speech.47 Second, the test requires a determination of
whether the governmental interest in regulating the commercial
speech is substantial. 48 Finally, if the speech at issue is lawful, and
the government interest is substantial, then the statute must directly
advance the governmental interest being asserted and do so in a
manner that is limited to that which is necessary to assert that
38 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 566 (1995) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)) (stating
generally that the First Amendment does not apply to private actors).
39 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (citing Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-1
(1973)).40 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
41 See id. See also State by Humphrey v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d
882, 885 (1992) (holding that there is no presumption of constitutionality where
a statute circumscribes speech and that the state bears the burden of proof
demonstrating constitutionality).42 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
43 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
44See generally Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
45 See Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989) (condensing the third and fourth prong of the Cent. Hudson test into a
third prong only).
46 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
47 Id.
48 Id.
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 4
FALL 2002] NORTH CAROLINA ANTI-SPAM STATUTE 99
interest.49 The last two prongs may be condensed such that there is
a reasonable "' fit between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends." 50 The Central Hudson test
applies to both state and federal government actors regulating
commercial speech. Thus, it applies in evaluating the
constitutionality of the North Carolina anti-spam statute for
purposes of the First Amendment because the North Carolina
statute limits commercial speech by granting standing to the state
attorney general. 5' The North Carolina statute also grants standing
to individuals and ISPs, but this requires a different First
Amendment analysis, which will be discussed in greater detail
below.
1. First Prong under Central Hudson Test
The first question under the Central Hudson test is whether
the speech is unlawful or misleading. If the speech is found to be
unlawful or misleading, it will not be afforded constitutional
protection. 52 Most spam is misleading, either because the message
itself misrepresents what is being sold or because false routing
information53 has been provided.54 In effect, falsified routing
information may be considered misleading because it prevents the
recipient from determining who actually sent the e-mail. Thus, a
court might either treat spain as unprotected speech under the first
prong of the test or rule that commercial speech itself is not
4 91 d. at 566-7.
50 Lysaght v. N.J., 837 F. Supp. 646, 650 (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S.
at 480). See also Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 414
(1993) (combining the last two prongs of the Cent. Hudson test into the
"reasonable fit" inquiry).
51 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458(b) (2002) (granting standing also to individuals
and ISPs).
S2 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
53 Sorkin, supra note 2 (defining routing information as the lines appearing in
the header line of the e-mail message, detailing the path of the e-mail from the
sender to the recipient).
54 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, 121 F. Supp. 2d
1255, 1259-60 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (explaining software which allows spammers
to manipulate headers to include false or misleading information).
unlawful, even when the vehicle by which it arrives, the message's
path of identity, is unlawful.
The North Carolina statute specifically prohibits sending e-
mail that "falsely identifies with the intent to deceive or defraud
the recipient" or that forges routing information. 55 This would
appear to satisfy the first prong of the Central Hudson test, which
allows state regulation of commercial speech that is unlawful or
misleading. Under this view, no further analysis under Central
Hudson would be required because the North Carolina statute
would satisfy the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, courts might not find spain unlawful or
misleading under the first prong of the Central Hudson test for two
reasons. First, as mentioned above, the North Carolina statute
requires that the e-mail be false or misleading.56 There are two
parts of a spain e-mail that may be misleading, the routing
information and the actual message itself. These two parts require
separate inquiries and present different outcomes. Arguably, the
message itself is the actual speech, while routing information,
although possibly false, is not speech but, rather, a technical
requirement of sending an e-mail that does not depend on truth of
origin for it to be sent. Thus, a truthful message sent with false
routing information would still need to be analyzed under the
Central Hudson test because the message itself is not false or
misleading.
On the other hand, an e-mail's delivery mechanism might
bear the same speech characteristics as the e-mail message itself.
Consider one's own experience. Upon opening one's inbox, a
person might erase messages with an unrecognized name or e-mail
return address. Speech is that which transports ideas. False
routing information represents an idea, the idea that this e-mail is
spam. Under this rationale, routing information is speech, and its
truth or falsity would bear on whether or not a court advances past
the first prong of the Central Hudson test. If a court treats both the
55 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458(a)(6) (2002). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
152.4(A)(7) (2002) (regulating falsified routing information); WASH. REv.
CODE § 19.190.020(l)(a) (2002) (regulating falsified routing information).
56 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458(a)(6) (2002).
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message and the routing information as speech, then both would
need to be unlawful or misleading to fail the first prong of the test.
Courts may be reluctant to find spain unlawful or
misleading under the first prong of Central Hudson for another
reason. The North Carolina statute requires that a false or
misleading e-mail also violate an ISP's policies.57 Thus, even if an
e-mail is false or misleading in its subject message, it is not
unlawful unless it violates an ISP's own spain policy. Since ISPs
have different spam policies, what might violate one ISP's policy
might not violate another's spain policy. In essence, the Central
Hudson analysis under the first prong, determining if the message
is unlawful or misleading, changes depending upon the contours of
an ISP's span policy. First Amendment protections, thus, would
hinge primarily upon the policy of an ISP and, secondarily, upon
the statutory definition of what is considered illegal.
2. Second Prong under Central Hudson Test
The second prong of the Central Hudson analysis asks
whether the government has a substantial interest in regulating the
speech at issue. 58 In a case considering a type of speech analogous
to spain, Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. F. C. C.,59 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized a substantial governmental interest in
preventing the cost shifting that results from junk faxing. Plaintiff
Destination Ventures, Ltd. argued that it had been
unconstitutionally singled out for regulation since the FCC had not
demonstrated that unsolicited faxes have a greater cost-shifting
effect than other types of faxes.60 The court responded that
Congress's goal was to prevent the shifting of advertising costs,
which was accomplished by limiting the statute to commercial
5 7 id.
58 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
59 Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995).
60 id.
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faxes,61 and that this amounted to a substantial governmental
interest.
62
The government also has a substantial interest in regulating
spain e-mail. The costs that spam e-mail places upon ISPs and
consumers are well documented. The property interests of
computer users and ISPs deserve protection. Moreover, the
Internet has become central to modem-day communication. These
factors converge to form a substantial governmental interest.
Conversely, in dicta, two courts have cast doubt upon a
state's substantial interest in regulating bulk mail, not e-mail, by
comparing it to a state's substantial interest in regulating
telemarketers.63 State by Humphrey v. Casino Marketing Group64
and Lysaght v. State of New Jersey65 held that a telemarketer's
telephone call is very different from unsolicited bulk mail and
differentiated a state's substantial interest in "protecting the
privacy of the home" from regulating bulk mail.66
Casino Marketing was a state action against a company that
used automatic dialing announcement devices to make 28,000 to
32,000 calls per day in violation of a Minnesota statute.6' The
defendant, Hall, counterclaimed on the 6round that the statute
facially violated the First Amendment. Using the Central
Hudson analysis, the court, finding that the state had a substantial
interest in both protecting the privacy of the home and preventing
69telemarketing fraud, upheld the statute. In reaching its
conclusion, however, the court stated that "unlike the unsolicited
bulk mail advertisement found in the mail collected at the
resident's leisure, the ring of the telephone mandates prompt
61 Id
62 Id.
63 Lysaght v. N.J., 837 F. Supp. 646, 649 (D.N.J. 1993) (quoting State by
Humphrey v. Casino Mktg. Group, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 882, 888-9 (Sup. Ct.
Minn. 1992)).
64 Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 888-9.65 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 650.
66Id. (quoting Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 888-9).
67 Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 884 (referring to MINN. STAT. §§ 325E.26-
325E.31 (2001)).68 Id. at 884-5.
69Id. at 885,891-2.
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response, interrupting a meal, a restful soak in the bathtub, even
intruding on the intimacy of the bedroom." 70 Certainly, the
distinction between a telemarketer's phone call and bulk mail
could be extended to unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail. This
would, in turn, cast doubt on a state's substantial interest in
regulating bulk e-mail.
The Lysaght court evaluated a statute virtually identical to
Minnesota's statute, but unlike the court in Casino Marketing, it
found a First Amendment violation, at least for purposes of issuing
a preliminary injunction, because there was "not a reasonable fit
between the statute and the interest in protecting persons in their
homes." 71 While the court upheld the government's interest in
protecting the privacy of the home as substantial, it relied on the
language in Casino Marketing that explicitly differentiated
between unsolicited bulk mail and a telephone call, stating that a
telephone call is "'uniquely intrusive.
' ' 72
Both courts gave significant weight to the privacy interests
of the unwilling listener, which today is an even greater concern
because those depending on e-mail for personal and business
communication are essentially a captive audience. Given the
modern dependence on e-mail, the overwhelming amount of junk
messages received, and the cost shifting involved, a state arguably
has a substantial interest in regulating spam.
3. Third and Fourth Prongs under Central
Hudson Test
If a court finds that the speech in question is not unlawful
or misleading and that a state has a substantial interest in
regulating the speech, Central Hudson then posits two secondary
questions: whether the statute directly advances the governmental
interest being asserted and whether it is narrowly tailored to
70 Id. at 888 (emphasis added).
71 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 650-3 (stating also that at trial the issue might be
resolved in favor of the statute).
72 Id. at 650 (quoting Casino Mktg., 491 N.W.2d at 888-9).
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address the interest being asserted.73 Put another way, there must
be a reasonable "'fit between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends."'4 The Lysaght court held that
"the distinctions drawn by the Act-between commercial
telephone advertisements and noncommercial calls, and between
prerecorded and live solicitations" were not reasonably related to
New Jersey's interest in protecting the privacy of the home, mostly
because both "equally disrupt residential privacy., 75 This
assertion, that all calls are equal for purposes of disrupting privacy,
may be countered by everyday logic. While there are exceptions,
commercial solicitations are usually disruptive, while most non-
commercial phone calls are personal in nature and, thus, not
necessarily disruptive. The court's logic would abolish the great
distinction between seeing an uninvited salesperson, quite
unwelcome, and seeing one's family, not so disruptive, both sitting
in one's living room at the end of a workday.
North Carolina's interest in regulating bulk e-mail is
substantial and can be discerned from both the statute itself and the
legislative history. The stated intent is to provide for efficient
Internet access helping ISPs and consumers instead of a "system
clogged with unsolicited bulk e-mail., 76 The statute gives ISPs,
individual users, and the State standing to sue spammers in order to
discourage spamming and provide for damages. 77 The legislative
ends, to facilitate quick and efficient access to the Internet, are
reasonably tied to the means, given that up to eighty-five percent
of the e-mail entering one's Inbox is spam.78 In short, the means,
the prevention of spain, seems to be the best way of accomplishing
the statutory end of keeping e-mail running efficiently. The state
73 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-3
(1980).74 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 650 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
75 Id. at 651 (admitting, however, that the constitutional issue was a close
question).76Hearing, supra note 27, at 1-2.
77 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453(lb), (4a), (6b), (6c), (10), 14-
458(6)(b)-(c), 1-539.2A(a), 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).78 Norah Vincent, Put a Tight Leash on Spammers, L.A. TIMES, August 15,
2002, at B15.
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in Lysaght also made a numbers argument but was unable to prove
that the amount of telemarketer phone calls was, in fact,
overwhelming. 79 This, however, would not be the case with spam
e-mail 80
North Carolina's anti-spam statute further meets the
reasonable fit test 81 because of provisions that narrow its scope.
82
The e-mail recipient, for example, must have consented to receive
the message.83 Bulk commercial e-mail may not be unsolicited.84
The e-mail may not be sent to strangers who did not ask to receive
it.85 The means by which e-mail is regulated, unsolicited and
commercial in nature, further ensure a reasonable fit between the
means used to accomplish the ends of eliminating spam.
86
D. Private Restrictions on Free Speech and the First
Amendment
The First Amendment serves only as a barrier against
87government action restricting speech, not private action. Yet,
79 Lysaght, 837 F. Supp. at 651.
80 Henry Norr, Spain Stampede Clogs Internet, E-mail Now One-third
Advertising, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 8, 2002), at
http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/09/08/MN1370
44.DTL (stating that 2.3 billion spam e-mails are sent daily) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
81 See Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989) (explaining that the best fit need not be perfect or the very best fit but,
rather, one best serving in proportion to interest).
82 See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453(lb), (4a), (6b), (c), (10), 14-
458(6)(b)-(c), 1-539.2A(a), 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002) (providing specific requirement
of commercial e-mail along with specific wording for users and equipment and
trespass regarding the penalties involved).
83 § 14-453(10).
84 See § 1-75.4(4)(c). See also Hearing, supra note 27, at 1 (A staffer suggested
that "unsolicited" be defined. California's statute, now codified as CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17538.4(e)(l)-(2) (Deering 2002), was copied.).
85 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-453(10) (2002).
86 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.
87 But see generally David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way
to the Cyber Forum: Public vs. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1 (1998) (exploring areas in which private actors have been subjected to
the First Amendment, the public forum doctrine, and looking at reasons why
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many of the plaintiffs in lawsuits filed against spammers are ISPs
or individuals. For example, an ISP in Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc.,88 a private corporation, brought an action against
a bulk e-mail company that used the ISP's equipment and accounts
to send spam. The ISP based its claim on the theory that it
constituted trespass to personal property or chattels.89 The
defendant, Cyber Promotions, Inc., claimed that such a restriction
violated the First Amendment.
90
The court did not find Compuserve confined by the First
Amendment because the First Amendment only guarantees
freedom of speech from abridgement by state actors.91 Cyber
Promotions argued that Compuserve's postmaster-like status
subjected it to the First Amendment, but the court refused to apply
the distinction because Compuserve was a private entity, not a
state actor.
92
The court's holding in Compuserve,93 that First
Amendment protections did not protect Cyber Promotions,
suggests that the standing given by the North Carolina statute to
private actors in suits against spammers94 will also survive First
Amendment scrutiny. It is inconsequential that the claim in
Compuserve was brought under state common law, as opposed to
statute, as would be the case in North Carolina, because a private
entity, not the government, was enforcing the Act.
95
spammers have been unsuccessful in convincing courts that the Internet should
be treated as a public forum for First Amendment purposes).
88 Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1024-5 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
89 Id.9 0 Id.
91 Id. (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976); Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995)).
92 Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1026.
93 1d. at 1025-6.
94 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.2A(a) (2002). Note that the North Carolina
General Assembly could theoretically have divided the remedy, such that state
action would apply only against bulk commercial e-mail, while private actions
would apply to e-mail generally. The statute would still pass constitutional
muster while allowing private individuals to define for themselves what they
consider spam.
95 Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1026-7.
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North Carolina ISPs and individuals should prevail on any
First Amendment challenge to the anti-spain statute because they
are private actors. State actors, as suggested above, will receive
more scrutiny.
96
E. The Dormant Commerce Clause & The Pike97 Test
Ironically, in its effort to escape the rocky shoals of the
First Amendment, the North Carolina statute becomes more
vulnerable to violating the dormant Commerce Clause. The
dormant Commerce Clause is the negative implication placed upon
states by virtue of the Commerce Clause. In effect, the states are
restrained in passing a law that intrudes upon the federal
prerogative to regulate commerce.98
Anti-spam statutes in Washington99 and California, 100 upon
which North Carolina's statute is modeled, recently survived
dormant Commerce Clause challenges.101 Both cases were
analyzed under the test set out in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 102 a
two-prong test that determines whether or not there has been a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.'0 3 Pike requires that
the law in question be facially neutral and that the local benefits of
the law outweigh interstate burdens. 0 4 If both elements of the test
are met, then the court analyzes the degree to which local benefits
96 See Joseph D'Ambrosio, Should "Junk" E-Mail Be Legally Protected?, 17
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 246 (2001) (stating that the
area is still an open question for litigation and that commercial e-mail will likely
be afforded First Amendment protections if truthful) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997).
97 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (establishing a two-part test
for dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
98 State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 409 (Wash. 2001) (citing Franks & Son, Inc. v.
State, 136 Wash.2d 737, 747 (Wash. 1998)).
99 See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.010-.050 (2002).
100 See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4 (Deering 2002).
101 See Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115
Cal.Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).




outweigh interstate burdens.' 0 5 Finally, the statute must not create
inconsistency between the states or regulate conduct wholly
outside of the state in question. 106
In State v. Heckel, 107 Washington sued an Oregon resident
for sending unsolicited commercial e-mail to Washington residents
containing misleading subject lines, false transmission paths, and
for not providing a valid return e-mail address on his bulk e-
mail. 10 8 The Washington Attorney General's Office contacted
Heckel about the spain, but it continued to receive complaints.'°9
Washington then filed suit. 10 The trial court granted summary
judgment to Heckel, holding that the statute violated the dormant
Commerce Clause."' In a unanimous opinion, the Washington
Supreme Court reversed, 1 2 using the two-prong Pike test in
determining that the anti-spain statute did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. 1
3
1. First Prong of the Pike Test
The first prong of the Pike test requires that a law be
facially neutral, that is, that it not discriminate against interstate
commerce in favor of intrastate commerce. 1 4 Heckel held that the
Washington anti-spam statute was not facially discriminatory
because it applied both to "persons " within and outside the
state. 15
The North Carolina anti-spam statute references persons in
the same context and manner as Washington's anti-spain statute" 16
o5 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409.
'0' Id. at 411 (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 143).
'
07 Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
'o' Id. at 407-8.
'09 Id. at 407.
110 Id.
... State v. Heckel, No. 98-2-25480-7, 2000 WL 979720, at * 1 (Wash.Super.
March 10, 2000).
112 Heckel, 24 P.3d (Wash. 2001).
"13 Id. at 409 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
114 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
"' Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409 (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 19.190.020(1) (2002)).
116 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458(a) (2002).
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by stating that "unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail...
sent into or within this State by the defendant" is a statutory
violation.117 It does not provide for a different standard or
treatment toward out-of-state spammers but, rather, "applies
evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state spammers.' 1 8 Thus, it is
likely that a court would find that the North Carolina statute
satisfies the first prong of the Pike test if challenged on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds.
2. Second Prong of the Pike Test
If the first prong of the Pike test is satisfied, then the
analysis advances to the second prong. 119 This requires a
"balancing of the local benefits against the interstate burdens."'
120
The Heckel court cited three key groups within the state that were
protected by the anti-spam statute: ISPs, the true owners of forged
domain names, and senders of e-mail. 121 The court described the
numerous and well-documented problems that arise from span
122
and held that these spam-related problems proved that local
benefits outweighed potential burdens to interstate commerce.'
23
Like its Washington counterpart, the North Carolina anti-
spam statute satisfies the second prong of the Pike test. First, it is
not any broader than the Washington statute and, as such, creates
no additional interstate burdens. Even though the North Carolina
statute regulates spammers based upon an ISP's policies, which
Washington's statute does not do, this difference actually narrows
the reach of the North Carolina statute. An out-of-state spainmer,
for example, sending e-mail to a North Carolinian would not be
117 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
"8 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409.
"9 Id. (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
120 id.
121 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409.
112 Id. at 409-11 (describing the burden on ISP equipment due to spam, the loss
of customers, the economic harm suffered by owners of impermissibly used
domain names and e-mail addresses, frustration on the part of individual e-mail
users, and the effects of cost-shifting). See also Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc.,
115 Cal.Rptr. 2d 258, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
123 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409.
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liable in North Carolina if the ISP's policy allowed spam because
the North Carolina statute only makes spam illegal if it violates the
ISP's policy.' 24 Illegality for purposes of the North Carolina
statute is a function of an ISP's spai policy.125
Second, the problems of spai in Washington are
sufficiently similar to spai problems in North Carolina.
Arguably, there is the similar effect of cost shifting from spammer
to ISP and consumer, and there are similar amounts of spam. It
follows that the local benefits realized in North Carolina from
reducing spam are similar to the benefits gained in Washington,
and as Heckel notes, l2 7 these benefits outweigh interstate burdens.
Once it has been established that local benefits outweigh
potential burdens to interstate commerce, the test explores the
degree to which benefits outweigh burdens. 28 Instead of
providing more evidence of local benefits, Heckel followed Pike 's
example 129 and focused on the burden of compliance placed upon
commercial spammers. 130 The court reasoned that the only true
burden the Act presented was one of truthfulness, which would
basically eliminate the problem of bulk e-mail because the act of
compliance would make bulk e-mail unattractive to spammers.131
Rather than a burden to interstate commerce, the court actually
found truthfulness to be a facilitator to interstate commerce by
"'eliminating fraud and deception.,' 1 32 For example, truthful bulk
e-mail would both allow one to know to whom to reply in order to
be removed from a bulk mailer's list, as well as allow
1
24 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
125 See id.
126 See Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409-11 (describing the burden on ISP equipment due
to spain: the loss of customers, the economic harm suffered by owners of
impermissibly used domain names and e-mail addresses, frustration on the part
of individual e-mail users, and the effects of cost-shifting). See also Ferguson,
115 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 267.
127 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409-11.12 81 d. at 410-1.
129 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970).
30 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411.
131 Id. (citing Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 819 (2001)).
132 id.
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identification of a message as junk mail without opening it.133
Only fraudulent interstate commerce is hampered. This further
benefits non-fraudulent interstate commerce.
3. The Two Pike Subtests
There were two other parts of the Pike test that the
Washington statute had to survive. The statute could not "1) create
inconsistency among the states, and 2) regulate conduct occurring
wholly outside of Washington."' 34 The Washington statute did not
create inconsistency because no other state requires e-mail to be
deceitful.135 While other states may have additional requirements,
the court stated, these requirements "merely create additional, but
not irreconcilable obligations," which is sufficient for purposes of
surviving a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.'
36
Commentators have noted that if a statute imposes an
affirmative obligation, such as requiring identification in the
subject line, as opposed to a negative obligation, such as
prohibiting false routing information, there could be a dormant
Commerce Clause problem. 137 In effect, the imposition of
affirmative obligations forces a junk mail sender "to comply with a
superset of all state regulations or not send e-mail altogether."' 13
8
The North Carolina statute has no such affirmative obligation. The
only external obligation is the truthfulness inquiry the Heckel court
adequately addressed. 139 Since states support non-fraudulent
commerce, the North Carolina statute does not create inconsistency
among the states and should pass this part of the test.
The second part of the Pike test applied by Heckel required
that the statute not regulate activity "wholly outside of
131 Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411.
134 id.
135 Id. at 412.136 Id. (citing Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d
813, 826 (3d Cir. 1994)).
137 Michelle Armond, Cyberlaw: State Internet Regulation and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 379, 399-400 (2002).
131 Id. at 400.
139Heckel, 24 P.3d at 412.
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Washington."'' 40 Washington's statutory construction imposes
geographical limitations: it only applies to e-mails sent from a
computer in Washington or to an e-mail address that the bulk e-
mailer knows or has reason to know is that of a Washington
consumer. 141 The statute does not regulate conduct exclusively
outside of Washington. While the bulk e-mail might be coming
from across the river, by targeting Washington consumers, it is
landing on Washington shores.
North Carolina's statute, however, has a wider application.
It applies to e-mails sent into or within North Carolina in violation
of an ISP's policies. 142 There is no requirement that the e-mail be
sent from a computer or through a server actually located in North
Carolina. Nonetheless, the broader geographical reach of the
North Carolina statute should not pose a problem because instead
of controlling out-of-state commerce in any way, the law is
actually controlled by the spain policies of ISPs, wherever they
may be located. By making a violation of the North Carolina law a
function of an ISP's policies, the statute is not regulating
commerce but, rather, mirroring the policy of the private ISP
through which the spammer contracted to receive service. This
partially addresses the concern that the North Carolina statute is
regulating commerce outside of North Carolina because an ISP is
allowed to formulate its own spain policy, regardless of North
Carolina law. It could be argued that there is still an impermissible
regulation of interstate commerce, since there is an impact from
the North Carolina statute, in the form of penalties levied against a
spammer outside of North Carolina. This argument fails because
the regulation of the spammer is no greater an exercise of authority
than the regulation already governing the spammer in the form of
the private contract signed between himself or herself and the ISP.
14 1Id. at 411.
141 See WASH. REv. CODE § 19.190.020(1) (2002). See also CAL. BuS. & PROF.
CODE § 17538.4 (Deering 2002) (applying only to e-mail that is sent through a
server physically located in California). But see Armond, supra note 137, at
397-8 (pointing out the troubling possibility that the California law's geographic
limitation could actually cause a dormant Commerce Clause problem, where a
"data packet" is sent through a server located in the state, thus opening up the
sender to liability).
142 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
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The penalty for violation may be greater than what an ISP would
levy, but the regulation against bulk e-mail is the same.
While some state Internet regulations have been found to
violate the dormant Commerce Clause, 143 the Washington and
California anti-spain statutes, both similar to North Carolina's anti-
spam statute, have survived dormant Commerce Clause
challenges. 144 The North Carolina statute should satisfy all
elements of the Pike test, including its inconsistency and
extraterritoriality elements.
II. The North Carolina Anti-Spam Statute Is and Will Remain
Ineffective
There are a number of reasons why the North Carolina anti-
spam statute has not been utilized effectively, including: few
resources at the state level to pursue spammers; a scarcity of
individual lawsuits; ISPs that use the state laws of their principal
place of incorporation, profit from spam, and view the rising trend
in e-mail as a legitimate means of advertisement; 145 and spammers'
ingenuity. Taken in combination, these factors have prevented
North Carolinians from taking shelter under a law that would be of
great benefit to them.
A. Lack of State Resources to Prosecute Spammers
While twenty-six states have anti-spam statutes, 146 only two
states, California and Washington, 147 have dedicated official
143 See generally Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a statute banning child pornography violated the
dormant Commerce Clause because the statute was "an unconstitutional
projection of New York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside New
York," the burdens on interstate commerce exceeded the local benefit derived
from it, and the statute was "inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most
extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether").
144 See State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001); Ferguson v. Friendfinders,
Inc., 115 Cal.Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
145 Tynan, supra note 4, at 110.
14 6 See ARK. CODE ANN. 5-41-205 (Michie 2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
17538.4 (Deering 2002); COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-2.5 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
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resources to prosecuting Spam.148 Arguably, the North Carolina
General Assembly allowed for private remedies knowing that state
enforcement would be haphazard at best. It should be noted that
ISPs have taken advantage of the private remedies available to
them in other states, both statutorily and through common law.'49
Yet, there remains a potentially powerful role for the state's
attorney general. Spam e-mail is not harmless, and individual
consumers and ISPs deserve state protection from daily
annoyances and unfair cost shifting.
The Washington Attorney General's Office, which has
taken a leading role in prosecuting unsolicited bulk e-mail, is an
exception to the inaction of other state attorneys general offices. It
53-451 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 937 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 48-603E
(2000); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 511 (1999); IOWA CODE § 714E (1999); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 73.6 (West 1999); 2002 Md. Laws 14-2901, 14-2902, 14-2903;
2002 Minn. Laws 325F.694; Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.020 (2000); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 205.4744, 205.4749 (Michie 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
75.4(4)(c); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.64 (Anderson 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit.
15, § 776 (1999); 1999 Pa. Laws 262; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52 (1999); 2002
S.D. Laws 180, 183; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 13-36-101, 102, 103, 104, 105 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.4 (2002);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.020 (1998); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6G-2 (1999);
WIS. STAT. § 944.25 (2001). See also David E. Sorkin, Spam Laws at
http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.html (listing anti-sparn statutes from
twenty-six states, as well as three states with statutes that regulate commercial e-
mail solicitations by lawyers) (last visited Oct. 27, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
147 Ferguson, 115 Cal.Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Heckel, 24 P.3d 404
(Wash. 2001).
148 See Washington State Attorney General's Office, Cyber
Clearinghouse/Consumer Protection/Junk E-mail, at
http://www.wa.gov/ago/clearinghouse/consumer/junke-mail/links.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). See also California Attorney General's Office's website at
www.caag.state.ca.us/_misc/content/spam.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
149 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998) (suing
under the common law remedy of trespass to chattels). See also Am. Online,
Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000)
(applying Virginia, Washington, and Iowa statutory law, federal law, and
common law).
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prosecuted Heckel 5 ° and has a website dedicated to spam that
collects consumer complaints, registers e-mail addresses so that
bulk e-mailers will have a master opt-out list, and gives practical
advice on how to take action against spammers.151 California
Attorney General Bill Lockyer also set up a website accepting
copies of spam to test for violations of California law which might
necessitate "consumer protection action., 152 It is likely that
California and Washington have been more proactive than North
Carolina on the issue of spam because of both states' status as
technological centers. Yet, North Carolina also has a formidable
technological sector in Research Triangle Park. Whatever the
reasons, the simple fact remains that California and Washington
are more active in prosecuting spammers.
Meanwhile, other state attorneys general have expressed
reservations about prosecuting spammers. Minnesota Attorney
General Mike Hatch stated that spam was not a priority for his
office and that there were not sufficient resources to manage the
problem.' 53 The North Carolina Attorney General's Office of
Public Information, explaining the lack of litigation filed on behalf
of individuals and ISPs by the state, has suggested that because the
North Carolina statute provides for criminal penalties, prosecution
would fall within the jurisdiction of local district attorneys. 15 4 The
Consumer Protection Division of the North Carolina Department
of Justice might be better qualified to bring this type of litigation
50 Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
151 Washington State Attorney General's Office, Cyber
Clearinghouse/Consumer Protection/Junk E-mail, at
http://www.wa.gov/ago/clearinghouse/consumer/home.html#Junk (last visited
Nov. 7, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
152 Norr, supra note 3 (stating that 2.3 billion spam e-mails are sent daily) (citing
CA Attorney General's Office, at www.caag.state.ca.us/_misc/content/spam.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology)).
153 Dianne Plunkett Latham, Spam Remedies, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1649,
1659 (2002) (citing Mike Hatch, Consumer Fraud in the Cyber Age: Efforts to
Protect Minnesotans Against Fraudulent Activities and Internet Crime, 1999
Minnesota State Bar Ass'n Computer Law Institute (MSBA 1999)).
154 E-mail from John Bason, Public Information Office, North Carolina
Department of Justice, to Michael Edwards, author of this article (Oct. 29, 11:09
AM EST) (on file with North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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because of its greater resources and the fact that anti-spam
legislation falls neatly under the rubric of consumer protection.
B. A Scarcity of Lawsuits Filed by Individuals
Nationally, there have been very few suits filed by
individuals against spammers. 155 It is possible that many people
do not know that their states even have anti-spam statutes that
allow them to sue. Another reason is the difficulty of proving
damages, combined with the amount of statutory damages likely to
be recovered. 156 While the North Carolina statute sets different
damages amounts for ISPs and individuals,157 the amounts are
ultimately a function of how many unsolicited bulk commercial e-
155 See David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited
Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 325, 358 (2001).
156 1d. at358 n.158.
157N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.2A(a) (2002).
Any person whose property or person is injured by reason of a
violation of G.S. 14-458 may sue for and recover any damages
sustained and the costs of the suit. Without limiting the
general of the term, 'damages' shall include loss of profits. If
the injury arises from the transmission of unsolicited bulk
commercial electronic mail, the injured person, other than an
electronic mail service provider, may also recover attorneys'
fees and may elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the
lesser of ten dollars ($10.00) for each and every unsolicited
bulk commercial electronic mail message transmitted in
violation of this section, or twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000) per day. The injured person shall not have a cause
of action against the electronic mail service provider which
merely transmits the unsolicited bulk commercial electronic
mail over its computer network. If the injury arises from the
transmission of unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail,
an injured electronic mail service provider may also recover
attorneys' fees and costs and may elect, in lieu of actual
damages, to recover the greater of ten dollars ($ 10.00) for
each and every unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail
message transmitted in violation of this section, or twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000) per day.
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mails were received. 158 It is estimated that a typical consumer will
receive approximately 1500 spain e-mails a year by 2006.159 If
even one-third of the spam messages could be tracked to one
sender, the amount recoverable would be $5,000 plus attorney
fees. 160 The technical and logistical difficulties in locating bulk e-
mailers make recovery difficult. This dampens any initiative to
sue.
With more money than the average spammer, ISPs
themselves would be an inviting target for spam suits by aggrieved
consumers, especially if the ISPs knowingly allow spammers to
use their networks. ISPs are given immunity from suit under the
North Carolina statute.' 61 The statute grants immunity to those
ISPs that "merely transmit" bulk e-mail over their networks.162 It
remains an open question, however, if this immunity extends only
to ISPs that are victims of the spammer. Arguably, those that
actively solicit or knowingly contract with spammers as customers
would lose their immunity under the North Carolina law, 163 even if
they had an anti-spain policy. An ISP that agrees to sell a
spammer network connection services performs a function much
different than "merely transmit[ting]" bulk e-mail. 164 The main
problem with this argument is that the spammer must actually be in
violation of the ISP's spain policy to be found liable, 165 and in this
case, the spammer is not in violation of the ISP's spain policy.
This scenario sheds light on a serious weakness of the North
Carolina anti-spam statute: it assumes that all ISPs are against
spam. As will be seen in the next section, some ISPs are moving
158 Id. Based on the assumption that an individual would not receive more than
2500 unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail messages per day.
159 Tynan, supra note 4.
160 Based on one-third of 1,500 e-mails times 10 dollars per e-mail (citing N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-539.2A(a) (2002) (allowing the lesser often dollars per e-mail
or twenty-five thousand dollars per day for damages for an individual)).




165 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (2002).
FALL 20021
in the direction of contracting with spammers; 166 under the North
Carolina law, spam e-mail sent through such an ISP is legal.
C. ISP Lawsuits
Nationally, ISPs constitute the majority of plaintiffs in suits
involving spam because they suffer the greatest impact from
spam. 167 Aside from the obvious incentive to protect their
businesses,1 68 ISPs also have the technical knowledge and financial
resources available to pursue spammers. If they succeed, damages
awards may be large, 169 but damages will be difficult to collect if
the company is bankrupt or financially weak. 170 The North
Carolina statute provides some added incentive because it
authorizes recovery of attorney's fees and gives the option of
damages, including lost profits, or the g reater of ten dollars per
unsolicited e-mail or $25,000 per day.
Nonetheless, ISPs have yet to use the North Carolina anti-
spam statute. One reason may be that ISPs prefer to use the laws
of their principal place of business. America Online, Inc., for
example, located in Virginia, has brought several lawsuits against
spammers using Virginia's anti-spain law. 172 ISPs also profit from
spam. Spammers pay large fees for the use of high capacity
166 See Tynan, supra note 4, at 109.
167 See Sorkin, supra note 155.
168 See State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 407 (Wash. 2001).
169 See Earthlink Wins Anti-spam Case But Collects No Money, NAT'L
JOURNAL'S TECH DAILY, at http://nationaljournal.com/cgi-
bin/ifetch4?ENG+ALL- -ALL PUBS- -TECHNOLOGY DAILYALL+7-
cr0199+106111 OREVERSE+0+32+4556+F+ 1 + 1+1 +spam+AND+PD%2f07%2f
19%2f2002%2d%3e07%2fl9%2f2002 (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (winning a
judgment of 24.8 million dollars) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
170 See id.
71 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.2A(a) (2002).
172 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890
(N.D. Iowa 2001); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D.
Va. 1998).
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circuits. 173 Additionally, ISPs are beginning to view e-mail
advertisement as a legitimate means of advertisement.174 As a
result, ISPs find themselves balancing the interests of their
traditional base, individual consumers, with big business, which
wants to use their servers to advertise.
D. Ingenuity on the Part of Spammers
Spammers use many successful techniques to send bulk e-
mail. While the North Carolina statute makes some of these
techniques illegal, such as providing false routing information,175
these are the very techniques that make it difficult to catch
spammers. For example, spammers have learned to route e-mails
through international servers in order to maintain anonymity.
176
"'The typical [spam] operation has five to ten stealth servers
pumping spam all day long through Chinese and Korean
relays. ,,17P Further, spammers often sign up with the same carriers
numerous times, 178 and software programs allow spammers to send
e-mail with a false return address. 179 There are also software
programs that harvest e-mail addresses from websites. 18° In short,
there are a variety of ways to send spain without suffering the
consequences.
173 See Tynan, supra note 4, at 109 (quoting spammer Ronnie Scelson's
assertion that ISPs want his business because of the large monthly payments to
ISPs ($120,000/month) for use of three high capacity DS3 circuits).
174 See Tynan, supra note 4, at 110.
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458(a)(6) (2002).
176 Vaknin, supra note 5 (stating that "some spamners hack into unsecured
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of Known Spam Operations).
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III. Conclusion
The North Carolina statute should surpass First
Amendment challenges, though with more difficulty when the
plaintiff is a state actor. Following the example of the California
and Washington anti-spam statutes, the North Carolina anti-spam
statute should also surmount dormant Commerce Clause
challenges. Despite its structural strengths, the practical realities
have made the law a tool best utilized by ISPs because they suffer
damages that are more easily documented than the damages to
individuals. Furthermore, since illegality is defined as a function
of an ISP's anti-spam policy, the statute gives ISPs an efficient
mechanism for control, as ISPs can change spam policies as
conditions change. The law's downside, given the uneconomical
choice of individual action, is that individual consumers are left
waiting for their ISP or attorney general to take legal action.
Because provisions for damages are small and identifying
spammers is difficult, it is likely that the North Carolina anti-spam
statute will remain ineffective, unable to adequately protect the
population for which it was designed to fight in the battle against
spam.
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